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Abstract
The paper deals with the role of religion and the church in the post-socialist transformations of
society in Montenegro, focusing on the period from the 1990s to 2022. The goal of the paper is to
present the historical and sociological (non-)cooperation between the church and the state in
Montenegro and their reflection on social circumstances. According to sociological expertise,
secularization and atheization of the society carried out by the then political regime and aligned
with Marxist reflections on religion were in force until the 1990s. Subsequently, a period of
desecularization of society and revitalization of religion and religiosity followed. Accordingly, the
role of the church and religion in this republic has also changed. Namely, there is an increased role
of the church in the socio-political circumstances in Montenegro. The church’s role and its
reflection on socio-political reality is analyzed through three historical determinants: the period
from 1990 to 1998, marked by a symphony of cooperation between the church and the state. Then
follows the period from 1998 to 2008, when cooperation is observed with a dose of caution, and,
finally, the period from 2008 to 2021, which is marked by the cooling of church-state relations,
which culminated in the Law on Freedom of Religion as an essential point of disagreement
between the church and the then state policy and the ruling political establishment.
Keywords: religion, church, policy, secularization, desecularization, socialism, Montenegro.
Introduction
There has long been a debate in the sociology of religion about the concept of secularization
and its cause. Among the many theorists of secularization, there is no agreement on what
secularization is and what we might identify as the main causes of secularization. Theoretical
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discussions range from Bryan Wilson, 1 who believes that secularization is the withdrawal of
religion from the social sphere and finds the causes of secularization in the modernization and
urbanization of society, to Luckmann, 2 who finds the causes of secularization and the withdrawal
of religion in the privatization of religion and religious belief.
Bearing in mind the reflections of these two distinguished religious scholars, we believe
that secularization in Montenegro should also be viewed in that context. Namely, since the end of
the Second World War, the secularization of society has been in force in Montenegro. The causes
of that secularization should be sought, of course, in all aspects that have been detected by
numerous sociologists of religion as factors of weakening of religion and religiosity. However, the
causes of secularization in all socialist social orders should also be sought in the atheization of
society conducted by the then political establishment. Therefore, the weakening of religiosity and
the marginalization of the church were encouraged by systematically conducted and imposed
atheism in Montenegro. Since this has traditionally been a dominantly Orthodox area, it should be
emphasized that Orthodox Church in Montenegro was materially exhausted and without personnel,
therefore demonopolized. In accordance with the Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was still
present in the post-war Montenegrin society, religion is perceived as a form of human alienation,
or an “the opium of the people.” Considering this influence, it is not difficult to guess the treatment
of all religions in the socialist social order. The administration, loyal to the then political
establishment, mainly hindered and obstructed religious ceremonies and the celebration of
religious holidays. 3 The attitude of the then regime towards the Serbian Orthodox Church should
be sought in some historical memories; the regime believed that the existing intolerance in the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would subside by neutralizing religious feelings. 4 On the
other hand, there are opinions that such treatment of the church by the socialist regime should also
be sought in the internal weaknesses of the Serbian Orthodox Church, loyalty to the regime, schism

Bryan Wilson, Religion in Secular Society:A Sociological Comment, London C.A. Watts; 1966. Vilson, Brajan
(2005): Novi likovi hrišćanske zajednice, u: Makmaners, Dž., Oksfordska istorija hrišćanstva, Beograd: CLIO.
2
Tomas Lukman, (1994): Sekularizacija – moderan mit, u: ðorñević, B. D. Povratak svetog, Niš: Gradina.
3
Vladimir Bakrač, (2013): Religija i mladi – religioznost mladih u Crnoj Gori, Podgorica – Beograd, Miba book.
4
Mirko Blagojević, (2005): Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva, Beograd: Filip Višnjić.; Mirko Blagojević,
(2008): “Religiozna Evropa, Rusija i Srbija juče i danasargumenti empirijske evidencije: slučaj Evropa,” Filozofija i
društvo, Vol. 19. No.3. pp. 275-294.
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within the church, etc. 5 The very rigid attitude of the socialist regime towards religion 6 lasted until
the beginning of the 1970s. In the mid-seventies, however there was a certain relaxation of the
political attitude towards religion and the church. 7
Although not overly extensive, empirical evidence testifies to secularization in the
Montenegro area. For example, according to the Census of 1953, about 32% of the population did
not want to declare their denomination, which is also the highest score in comparison with the
other republics of Yugoslavia. According to Dragomir Pantić’s research from that period 8 a turn
towards atheism is clearly visible. It is noticeable that this turn was particularly pronounced in the
areas of Serbia and Montenegro where Orthodoxy was dominant. According to empirical evidence,
the level of non-religiosity in Montenegro was very high, and scientific circles concluded that this
was an area where religious deadness reigned. 9 According to the research from 1974 to 1984,
Montenegrins were the most non-religious--77% in comparison with other nations and
confessions. 10 From that period, the research of Srđan Vrcan 11 on the youth population is worth
mentioning. According to his research, only 12% of young people declared themselves as religious
and 73% as non-religious.
Since the end of the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a desecularization
of society and a revitalization of religion in almost all parts of the world, 12 and therefore in
Montenegro as well. At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the attitude of the
socialist political order towards religion loosened. In Montenegro, it came to the so-called “delayed
revitalization” in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The processes of desecularization and the return
of religion coincided with the fall of the socialist socio-political order. A return to traditional
religions within the social scene followed. Religion again attributed identity and legitimacy to the

Milan Vukomanović, (2001): Sveto i mnoštvo-izazovi religijskog pluralizma, Beograd: Čigoja štampa.
Vladimir Bakrač, Danijela Vuković-Ćalasan, Predrag Živković, and Rade Šarović. (2020): "Adventists in
Montenegro—From the Atheistic Psychosis of Socialism to the Post-socialist Individuation of
Adventism" Religions 11, no. 5: 233. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11050233
7
Milan Vukomanović, “Karakter religijskih promena u zemljama u tranziciji: primer pravoslavnih crkava u Rusiji i
SR Jugoslaviji,: in: Promene postsocijalističkih društava iz sociološke perspektive, (Beograd: IDN, 1997).
8
Dragomir Pantić, Klasična i svetovna religioznost, (Beograd: Centar za politikološka i javnomnenjska istraživanja,
1988.
9
Dragoljub Đorđević, O religiji i ateizmu-prilozi sociologiji religije, (Beograd-Niš: Gradina-Stručna knjiga, 1990).
10
Sergej Flere, Religija i religioznost u jugoslovenskom društvu, (Kultura, 1984), pp. 65-67.
11
Srdjan Vrcan, “Omladina, religija i crkva,” in:V. Iličin i saradnici, Ogledi o omladini osamdesetih, (Zagreb: IDIS,
1990.
12
Piter L. Berger, “Desekularizacija sveta: opšti pregled,” in: Piter, L. Berger, Desekularizacija sveta, (Novi Sad:
Medi Terran., 2008).
5
6

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2022) XLII, 9

40

community, integrating the individual into the collective. Theologian Radovan Bigović described
it as the period when the Orthodox renaissance occurred at the end of the 20th and the beginning
of the 21st century. 13
The revitalization of religion is also evident according to empirical indicators. According
to the Census of 1991, 2003, and 2011, an increase in those who declare to belong to one of the
religions 14 is evident. According to research from 1996, 15 about 93.7% of respondents in
Montenegro self-identified denominationally. According to research from 2000, only 1/5 of
respondents show a low level of religiosity, 57.1% show a medium level of religiosity, and 22.2%
of respondents are actively religious. 16 The research on young people from 2013 has already shown
a kind of stabilization in religiosity, so about 90% declared that they are religious, and about 70%
of respondents believed in God. 17 Therefore, a number of respondents consider themselves
religious, without believing in God as described in the Bible. They believe that there is some
mystical power, but that it is not God in the Judeo-Christian sense. Also, a certain number of
believers self-assess themselves as religious, but they do not follow religious and liturgical
practices, and do not go to church.
The return of religion to the social scene and religiosity in society was also marked by a
symphony of religion and politics. Since Montenegro is a predominantly Orthodox country, we
will focus our attention only on the relationship between politics and the Orthodox Church.
The Period of the Symphony in the Relationship between the Church and the State
The desecularization of society in Montenegro was followed by the collapse of the socialist
regime and the coming to power of some new political figures. In the early 1990s, when the first
post-war parliamentary elections were held and a multi-party system was established, three,
conditionally speaking, dominant options crystallized in December 1990: the League of
Communists, the People’s Party, and the Liberal League; the latter was the only political party that

Radovan Bigović, , “Pravoslavna crkva i evropske integracije,” in: Religioznost grañana Srbije i njihov odnos prema
procesu evropskih integracija, (Beograd: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Centar za evropske studije, Hrišćanski kulturni
centar, 2011).
14
www.monstat.org
15
Vera Vratuša-Žunjić, , “Mogućnost anketnog istraživanja uloge religije u raspadu Jugoslavije,” in: Religija, crkva,
nacija, (Niš: JUNIR, godišnjak III, 1996)..
16
Miloš Bešić, and Borislav Đukanović, Bogovi i ljudi: Religioznost u Crnoj Gori, (Podgorica: CID, 2000).
17
V. Bakrač, Religija I mladi – religioznost mladih u Crnoj Gori, (Podgorica – Beogra, Miba Book, 2013).
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advocated the independence of Montenegro. 18 The League of Communists changed its name to
the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) at the 1991 congress. Along with changes in the political
scene, the changes in religion also coincided. Namely, during 1990 there were personnel changes
in the Serbian Orthodox Church. Patriarch Pavle was elected at an extraordinary session of the
Assembly in December in place of Patriarch German, who had occupied that position for a full 32
years (1958-1990). Amfilohije (Radović), the former bishop of Banat, was elected by the
Assembly as the Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral. On December 30, 1990, Amfilohije
Radović was enthroned as the Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral, Zeta, Brda, and
Skenderija and Exarch of the Holy Throne of Peć by the Metropolitan Danilo Dajković. Since his
enthronement in the Cetinje monastery, Metropolitan Amfilohije was in harmonious relations with
the then authorities in Montenegro. 19

Conversely the then authorities also had a

harmonious relationship with the church. “This educated, spiritual, and rational man belongs to
the very top of Orthodox thinkers,” said the president of Montenegro Momir Bulatović for the
Metropolitan Amfilohije. 20 The cooperation between religion and politics in Montenegro was
particularly visible at the ethnic, religious, and linguistic levels. The Metropolitan Amfilohije, as
a spiritual shepherd, tried to neutralize all those changes and ruins that the real-socialist regime
left behind. He restored the spiritual wasteland in Montenegro, increased the number of priests,
restored many churches, monasteries, and temples, and restored ancient dioceses. 21 He was also
an opponent of the Montenegrin language, considering it non-existent. “Some say that we should
change our language and introduce a new, non-existent one that no one has ever spoken in
Montenegro. We can do that, but that does not restore the soul of Montenegro, its memory and
intellect.” On an ethnic level, the Metropolitan denied the existence of Montenegrin ethnic
distinctiveness, saying that such attempts were the product and legacy of the decades-long
communist regime. “May God grant that there will be as few of those who worship the pagan
Emperor, the cursed Diocletian, as possible, and may every Montenegrin nail him with a hammer
to the Vizier bridge.” 22 Denying the Montenegrin ethnic distinctiveness and considering that
Montenegrins are Serbs in a wider ethnic group led to certain discord in Montenegro. It caused
Živko Andrijašević. Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti, (Bar: Conteco, 1999).
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/mitropolit-amfilohije-in-memoriam/30919884.html
20
https://www.vreme.com/vreme/ratnik-u-mantiji/
21
https://www.novosti.rs/crna-gora/vesti/931003/vratio-narod-obnovio-650-crkava-dolaskom-amfilohija-tronmitropolita-1990-godine-pocela-duhovna-obnova-preobrazaj-crne-gore
22
http://www.srpsko-nasledje.rs/sr-l/1998/11/article-12.html
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numerous polemics, conflicts, and divisions. Already in 1991, on St. Peter’s Day (July 12), there
was a confrontation in front of the Cetinje monastery between the parties close to the Liberal
League, which has inherited the view of Montenegrin ethnic distinctiveness, and the supporters of
“the pro-Serbian parties,” the believers of the Serbian Orthodox Church. It was a conflict between
pro-Montenegrin and pro-Serbian political concepts because the diversity stemmed from the
present political ideologies, not church dogmas. 23 When it comes to ethnicity, the then political
establishment had similar views to the church. Milo Đukanović, the current president of
Montenegro, gave an interview to TV Politika in the early 1990s in which he emphasized:
“Montenegrins are proud of their Serbian origin and Montenegrin statehood, of the glorious history
of the Serbian people. That is why we believe in a common future and prosperity.” 24 The fact that
a referendum for Montenegrin independence was held in Montenegro on March 1, 1992, also
showed that there was an agreement between the church and the state regarding ethnic issues. In
the referendum in Montenegro, most citizens who went to the polls voted for a common state with
Serbia. The leaders of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists and other pro-Yugoslav political
parties said at the time that the people of Montenegro and Serbia were connected by ethnic,
economic, cultural, historical, and other ties, which referred them to the common interest to live
in one state. The results were as follows: 95.96% of all regional voters chose the joint state of
Serbia and Montenegro, i.e., Yugoslavia. 25 On April 29, 1992, Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović
said for the Belgrade magazine “Duga,” “The backbone of those united countries is already known
and, despite all the troubles, it is again taking shape, and that is Serbia and Montenegro.” 26 Judging
from the above the cooperation between sacred and secular authorities in Montenegro can be
clearly seen, while it was pointed out with dignity that the Orthodox Church in Montenegro is the
Serbian Orthodox Church.
The beginning of the 1990s was marked by political pluralism; the one-party system was
replaced by a multi-party system. However, a kind of religious pluralism also occurred in that
period. Namely, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC) was formed in October 1993. The issue
of the CPC has become the subject of numerous debates in the political and intellectual public, not
Živko. Andrijašević,.Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti, (Bar: Conteco, 1999).
https://www.espreso.co.rs/svet/crna-gora/508521/crnogorci-su-ponosni-na-srpsko-poreklo-i-slavnu-istorijusrpskog-naroda-da-li-se-djukanovic-danas-stidi-ovih-reci
25
https://www.nedeljnik.rs/vecina-gradana-crne-gore-se-izjasnila-za-zajednicku-drzavu-sa-srbijom-na-danasnji-danodrzan-je-prvi-referendum-za-nezavisnost/
26
https://www.vijesti.me/zabava/36140/vrijeme-kad-je-ljubav-cvjetala
23
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only in Montenegro, which reflects on the political and identity reality. One or another church will
become the positioning point of the political elites that will (mis)use the religious moods of the
followers depending on their daily political interests.
Period of Partial Cooperation
The level of cooperation slowly began to change after almost a decade of cooperation
between the church and the state (from 1998 to 2008). This second decade, which we have
analyzed, was marked by rather turbulent relations between the church and the state. In 1997,
conflicts erupted in the strongest political party in Montenegro at that time, and the main point of
disagreement was cooperation 27 with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPS) and Slobodan
Milošević 28 in Serbia. 29 The split in DPS resulted in the removal of Momir Bulatović from the
position as president of DPS, who founded the People Socialist Party of Montenegro (SNP) in
1998; since then, different political circumstances commenced in Montenegro. During that period,
the ruling establishment enjoyed the support of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Metropolitan
Amfilohije. That was the period when Milo Đukanović needed the support of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, as well as the Metropolitan’s indisputable authority among the people, to suppress
demonstrations and riots that supporters of Momir Bulatović and Slobodan Milošević would cause.
The event when President Đukanović burned the badnjak tree 30 with the Metropolitan Amfilohije
in Cetinje on Christmas Eve in 1998 was recorded historically. Metropolitan saw in President
Đukanović a person who would work on further strengthening the two fraternal nations - Serbs
and Montenegrins and the community of Serbia and Montenegro. President Đukanović visited the
Cetinje monastery, kissed the relics of Saint Peter of Cetinje and the cross, and the Metropolitan
addressed him with the following words:

Radenko.Šćekić, Politička previranja u Crnoj Gori 1996 - 1998. Godine. (Prizma, 2012). pp. 121-166.
“The victory of the “Let’s Live Better” coalition has actualized the issue of the relationship between all federal units
of the FRY because the ruling “red-black” coalition in Serbia (SPS-JUL-SRS) persistently opposed the practice of
Montenegro’s equality in the federation, market reforms, democratization, and resolutely refused to fulfil the
conditions for the return of the FRY to the international community. It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the
results of the May elections have intensified the need for the two ruling coalitions in Serbia and Montenegro, which
are
essentially
different,
to
find
a
modus
vivendi
at
the
federal
level.”
https://www.ucg.ac.me/skladiste/blog_13542/objava_70781/fajlovi/Vladimir%20Goati%20_%20Partije%20i%20pa
rtijski%20sistem%20Crne%20Gore.pdf
29
http://www.maticacrnogorska.me/files/49/05%20radenko%20scekic.pdf
30
Balkan Orthodox custom at Christmas time.
27
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Mr. President, among other joys, we have waited for this blessed day to happen that
the newly elected President of Montenegro comes for a blessing and kisses the relics of
Saint Peter of Cetinje. It is a blessed day for Montenegro because Montenegro has been
waiting for more than 50 years for its first man to come and kiss the relics of the first
and greatest Montenegrin. Saint Peter of Cetinje is the measure of every metropolitan
and every lord, every president of Montenegro. President Đukanović, you have realized
and understood that, and that is why you are here today. May this day be blessed, may
you be blessed in carrying the heavy burden of the first man of Montenegro and the
leader of this nation. 31
Not long after, the Montenegrin political establishment changed its political course. The
idea of Montenegrin independence from Serbia began to heat up already in 2001. Hence, the
church directed the first criticisms at state politics. The first accusations of the authorities in
Montenegro that the Metropolitan interfered too much in politics were launched. The Metropolitan
responded to accusations in an interview for the newspaper Glas javnosti with the following words:
People who were brought up in the previous system are now surprised that someone besides
them can dare to worry about the destiny of people because, for God’s sake, they are the
only authentic interpreters of the people’s wishes, the people’s will, and the resolvers of
the people’s destiny. What would those gentlemen or comrades say if the Metropolitan of
Montenegro and the Littoral began to engage in politics the way Bishop Danilo Petrović
or even St. Peter of Cetinje did? 32
The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral did not look at the referendum on the
independence of Montenegro with enthusiasm. That was confirmed by the Metropolitan
Amfilohije’s words in the interview for Glas javnosti when he said that the separation of
Montenegro would only happen if Serbia and Montenegro separated from the common mind,
historical being, language, etc. 33 In an interview for the German Der Spiegel Milo Đukanović
announced the referendum in 2006 and the victory of independent Montenegro. 34 Metropolitan
Amfilohije and the priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro followed the
referendum on the restoration of the independence of Montenegro with restraint; they did not
propagate the survival of the state union with Serbia, nor did they at least influence the final choice

https://www.vijesti.me/zabava/36140/vrijeme-kad-je-ljubav-cvjetala
http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/2002/02/03/srpski/I02020201.shtml
33
http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/2002/02/03/srpski/I02020201.shtml
34
https://www.gov.me/cyr/clanak/17961--6936
31
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of citizens with public statements. After the referendum, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral recognized independent Montenegro.
I have already told to our politicians that the moment when the majority of citizens
voted for the independence of Montenegro in the referendum, that moment the
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and
our dioceses located here, fully recognized and fully accepted Montenegro within the
limits in which it has existed and with all respect for it, its structure, laws, and everything
that belongs to a state. 35
By its actions, the Metropolitanate helped to maintain and preserve peace and stability after the
referendum, which pretty much polarized the citizens of Montenegro. Milo Đukanović’s words in
November 2021 about the late Metropolitan Amfilohije confirm this:
When we talked about the referendum, I spent hours convincing him why it was good,
and he convinced me why it was not good, and we agreed that it would not be wise for
him as the Metropolitan and the church to talk about that topic, and he kept his word. 36
Apparently, the Serbian Orthodox Church was ready for any outcome of the referendum.
After the referendum in 2006, there was a certain adaptation of the Serbian Orthodox Church to
the new situation regarding the state organization and independence of Montenegro. Accordingly,
the Cetinje metropolitan department remained the first type of primate with the Metropolitan as
honorary archbishop. It was defined that the Orthodox Church in Montenegro consisted of dioceses
of the Serbian Orthodox Church: Montenegrin and the Littoral, Budimljansko-Nikšićka, and parts
of dioceses Mileševska and Zahumsko-Hercegovačka by the decision of the Assembly of the
Serbian Orthodox Church on 26 May 2006, five days after the restoration of the state independence
of Montenegro. 37
Non-Cooperation between the Church and the State
After the referendum, the relationship between the church and the state cooled even more,
and everything culminated in 2008 when Montenegro recognized the independence of Kosovo.
Metropolitan Amfilohije considered the recognition of Kosovo the most shameful betrayal of
Montenegro and the dignity of the people. 38 The ruling political establishment created the policy
at an increasing distance from Serbia and Serbian ethnicity, and the recognition of Kosovo was
https://rtv.rs/sk/region/amfilohije-mitropolija-priznaje-nezavisnu-crnu-goru_259158.html
https://www.portalanalitika.me/clanak/dukanovic-o-amfilohiju-koliko-god-negirao-svoj-crnogorski-identitetzapravo-je-bio-tipican-crnogorac
37
https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/614492/sta-su-o-temeljnom-ugovoru-napisali-akademici-canu
38
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/mitropolit-amfilohije-in-memoriam/30919884.html
35
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only one of the political moves of the official policy of Montenegro. The church condemned the
distance between Montenegro and Serbia, which started a little earlier and was based on
introducing the Montenegrin language as an official language. The ever-closer cooperation with
the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, as the guardian of the ethnic distinctiveness of Montenegrins,
was not hidden. The phrase Church of Serbia, not the Serbian Orthodox Church, could be heard
more and more in the political establishment. In fact, the political establishment and Montenegrin
Orthodox Church (CPC) of the time claimed that the Church of Serbia illegally usurped the
churches, monasteries, temples, and property of the Orthodox Church in Montenegro and placed
them under its jurisdiction. 39 Preparing for the party congress, the leader of DPS, Milo Đukanović
advocated for the unification of the Orthodox believers in Montenegro, which would affect the
affirmation of the Montenegrin state, national, and cultural identity.
Hence, we are interested in overcoming this division, and that is why we are advocating that, if
possible, some reasonable approach is used to unify the Orthodox believers in Montenegro. It is
obvious that the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral as an autonomous but still part
of the Serbian Orthodox Church is not sufficiently in agreement with the state interests of
Montenegro. 40
The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral interpreted this statement with wonder,
considering it inappropriate to include topics concerning the canonical structure of the church in
the program of a party that has been considered socialist and civil.
The following political step performed by the ruling elite was membership in NATO,
which the church did not accept benevolently as well. At the DPS Congress held on 30 November
2019, the president of the party, Milo Đukanović, emphasized stability, harmony, and further
development of Montenegro as the main priorities. Accordingly, the further development of
Montenegro implies hard work towards achieving the main foreign policy goal, which is reflected

In Montenegro, especially after the dissolution of the state union Serbia and Montenegro, a kind of disintegrative
function of religion is present. It is more noticeable after the attainment of Montenegrin independence and efforts to
form a national distinctiveness, where the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC) represents as a basic or key factor of
the Montenegrin nation, i.e. she introduces herself as a fundamental factor of national existence and as a privileged
guardian of tradition and culture of the Montenegrin people. On the other hand, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro
and the Littoral as part of Srpska of the Orthodox Church (which is the canonically recognized Orthodox community
in Montenegro) strives to marginalize the Montenegrin national distinctiveness and to preserve the unity of the SPC
and Serbian people in these areas. Hence, religion, according to the principle of volens nolens, functions
disintegrationally on Montenegrin society, often departing from the framework of spirituality, and universality.Due to
contesting canonical rights, the rivalry between the two Orthodox churches continues even today.
40
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in Montenegro’s membership in the EU. The harmonious relationship is disturbed by religious
divisions among the Orthodox believers, which questions Montenegrin national identity. The
solution is found in “the restoration of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.”
Our primary interest is strengthening the state identity of Montenegro. DPS understands
the needs of all national communities. We must suppress the denying of the
Montenegrin identity. We have an obligation to restore the Montenegrin Orthodox
Church. 41
Bearing in mind that this statement came from the president of a party that is democratic and
socialist in terms of its political and ideological orientation, The Metropolitanate of Montenegro
and the Littoral reacted to this speech with concern. It was interpreted to be inappropriate that the
self-proclaimed atheistic president of a republic dared to influence and interfere deeply in the
church’s internal structure. His behavior violated the secular character of the state. 42 Such
announcements culminated in the Law on Freedom of Religion adopted by the Parliament of
Montenegro on 27 December 2019. According to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the law was
harmful, especially the article stipulating that religious communities must prove ownership of
church property that was built or was in state ownership since 1918. If they could not prove this,
the property would be registered officially as state property. The Metropolitanate of Montenegro
and the Littoral and other dioceses of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro said it was
gross discrimination. The Metropolitanate reacted with amendments to the mentioned law, calling
for the correction of three articles of the law for the sake of peace and love in Montenegro. 43 The
ruling structure later rejected it and passed the Law on Freedom of Religion, which put an end to
the already disturbed cooperation between the church and the multi-decade ruling structure in this
state.
The church responded to the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion with the famous
processions--peaceful and quiet resistance to the mentioned law. The law was opposed by a large
number of citizens, who expressed their dissatisfaction with a peaceful walk. Citizens were
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motivated not only by the Law on Freedom of Religion but also by other reasons, which were
reflected in rising crime rates, corruption, unemployment, nepotism, obedience to the ruling party,
economic crises, etc. Also, the multi-decade rule of a political oligarchy called into question
democracy; the democratic transition of power was unthinkable. Individuals loyal to the ruling
establishment alternated in various political positions and functions for many years and even
decades, regardless of educational or intellectual ability. Depending on the assignment by the
Government, individuals changed five ministerial departments each, and each had several
activities in other bodies and Management Boards, for which they received special fees. All of this
could have been the reason for the dissatisfaction of the people, which culminated in the Law on
Freedom of Religion. The privatization of the Montenegrin economic system carried out on the
waves of the neoliberal economy and the collapse of socialism, left the people at the mercy of the
private sector. These owners were mainly individuals who emerged overnight from the underbelly
of the newly created political-economic social order. The law was the cause of protests. It
effectively targeted church property, as interpreted by the Serbian Orthodox Church, and which
still remained beyond the reach of emerging businessmen and non-domestic sales, was the cause
of protests. Also, the people believed that attacks on the church, their identity was being attacked
and threatened too, increasing motivation for the persistent processions in protest. The first
processions were held on December 31, 2019 and continued throughout the state. Believers in
almost all cities, led by priests, first attended church ceremonies in the church sanctuaries in the
evening and then went for a walk along the main city streets; the Metropolitanate filed a
constitutional complaint, expecting the decisions of the Parliament to be declared unconstitutional.
The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral considered the mentioned law
fratricidal, while, on the other hand, the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church
and the head of that church Mihailo believed that Montenegro passed the Law on Freedom of
Religion that was in accordance with the most modern European standards. 44 It should be
emphasized here that the Montenegrin Orthodox Church presents itself as the guardian of the
Montenegrin identity and language. Almost no ceremony, reception, or event of state importance
could happen without the leaders of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church being in the front row.
That has left the impression that the ruling political establishment used the influence of the Serbian
Orthodox Church and Metropolitan Amfilohije until the beginning of the new millennium to
44
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preserve power and political positions. In the new millennium, the ruling political establishment
used the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church to homogenize the electorate
based on identity, language, and religious issues, all in the absence of economic arguments.
Therefore, the political rhetoric was based on ethnic and religious divisions with the aim of
securing another election victory on those anachronistic and tried-and-tested tactics since the
elections were scheduled for 30 August 2020.
It was a period full of events, from the COVID-19 pandemic that stopped the processions
for a short time to the arrest of people and clergy for gathering in religious buildings or in front of
them. All the events had an even greater impact on the people’s dissatisfaction, and the government
persisted in its decisions. President Milo Đukanović said on May 18, 2020, that he would not give
up on the formation or restoration of the Orthodox Church or the return of part of the church
buildings to the state property, as stipulated by the Law on Freedom of Religion. 45 The processions
continued, and the epilogue of the months-long protests resulted in a narrow victory of two
coalitions close to the Serbian Orthodox Church–“For the Future of Montenegro”--the Democratic
Front, and “Peace is our Nation,”-- Democratic Montenegro, and one civic movement “Black on
White”--United Reform Action (URA). Metropolitan Amfilohije died on October 30, 2020, after
seeing the fall of the decades-long rule of the DPS and the will of the people expressed at
processions.
The new Government adopted and submitted the amendments to the Law on Freedom of
Religion to the parliamentary procedure on December 17, 2020. Amendments to the Law on
Freedom of Religion implied the deletion of disputed articles of the existing Law that referred to
the potential transfer of property of religious communities to state ownership in case religious
communities did not have adequate evidence that they were the owners of that property. The article
of the Law related to the registration of the religious community operating in Montenegro was also
deleted, and the term “religious community records” was introduced. The amended Law on
Freedom of Religion was adopted on December 29, 2021, exactly one year later.
Almost the entire year of 2021, at least when it comes to relations between the Serbian
Orthodox Church and the state, was spent dealing with issues of the Fundamental Agreement,
which would bring the legal regulations to an end. It is expected that the new government will
bring that process to an end. Bearing in mind the statement of Bishop Irinej Bulović to the
45

https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/godinu-dana-zakona-o-slobodi-vjeroispovijesti-u-crnoj-gori/31022713.html

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2022) XLII, 9

50

newspaper Pečat that “the Serbian Orthodox Church will not sign the Fundamental Agreement
with the Government of Montenegro as long as Zdravko Krivokapić is at its head,” 46 we can
conclude that the new ruling establishment did not meet the expectations of the Serbian Orthodox
Church either. Not long after, the government fell, and a minority government was formed. One
of the main promises of the minority government was the signing of the Fundamental Agreement
between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state of Montenegro. The new Prime Minister
Dritan Abazović articulated this intention in an interview for Deutsche Welle. 47 The promise was
formalized on August 3, 2022, when Patriarch Porfirije, on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
The Prime Minister of Montenegro, Dritan Abazović, signed the Fundamental Agreement in
Podgorica. Prime Minister Abazović said that with this signature, a new leaf had been turned over
in the relations between the church and the state. 48
Conclusion
We have tried to illustrate the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the
state, i.e., the decades-long political establishment in the analysis presented in the main part of the
paper, which is descriptive in its methodological character. Bearing in mind the rather long period
from 1990 to 2022, we can conclude that the relationship between the church and the state was
very meaningful. It ranged from close cooperation and syncopation of the church with the state, to
a complete cooling of the relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the ruling political
structure. As we indicated previously, there was close cooperation between the Serbian Orthodox
Church and the state in the first period from 1990 to 1998. Cooperation was mainly based on
corresponding identity issues in the context of the ethnic affinity of Serbs and Montenegrins. The
Serbian Orthodox Church provided support for the ruling political structure of the DPS, which
resulted in a convincing victory for that party in the parliamentary elections. With the split in the
DPS, the church, led by the Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović, took the side of the then Prime
Minister Milo Đukanović, which led to the victory of the DPS again in the parliamentary elections.
The cooling of church-state relations began at the beginning of the new millennium when the
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official political establishment began to change ethnic, religious, and linguistic affiliations in
Montenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church and the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the
Littoral did not look at the referendum in 2006 with enthusiasm. However, the recognition of the
outcome of the referendum undeniably contributed to peaceful relations in the state. The noncooperation between the church and the state culminated with the recognition of Kosovo by official
Montenegro. Nevertheless, the influence of the church on political circumstances was once again
confirmed in 2020. Namely, the ruling structure adopted the Law on Freedom of Religion, which
caused strong disapproval of the church and resulted in the fall of the ruling regime after a silent
protest in the form of processions. After that, the church reclaimed relevance in the public sphere,
an influence quite significant for the political circumstances in Montenegro. In other words, with
the collapse of the church’s role in political life, revitalization of its influence returns, and with the
signing of the Fundamental Agreement, a new period in the relationship between the church and
the state begins.
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